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We give explicit constructions of extractors which work for a source of any
min-entropy on strings of length n. These extractors can extract any constant
fraction of the min-entropy using O(log2 n) additional random bits, and can
extract all the min-entropy using O(log3 n) additional random bits. Both of
these constructions use fewer truly random bits than any previous construc-
tion which works for all min-entropies and extracts a constant fraction of the
min-entropy. We then improve our second construction and show that we
can reduce the entropy loss to 2 log(1/e)+O(1) bits, while still using
O(log3 n) truly random bits (where entropy loss is defined as [(source
min−entropy)+(# truly random bits used)−(# output bits)], and e is the
statistical difference from uniform achieved). This entropy loss is optimal up
to a constant additive term. Our extractors are obtained by observing that a
weaker notion of ‘‘combinatorial design’’ suffices for the Nisan–Wigderson
pseudorandom generator, which underlies the recent extractor of Trevisan.
We give near-optimal constructions of such ‘‘weak designs’’ which achieve
much better parameters than possible with the notion of designs used by
Nisan–Wigderson and Trevisan. We also show how to improve our con-
structions (and Trevisan’s construction) when the required statistical differ-
ence e from the uniform distribution is relatively small. This improvement is
obtained by using multilinear error-correcting codes over finite fields, rather
than the arbitrary error-correcting codes used by Trevisan. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Key Words: extractors; combinatorial designs; expander graphs; proba-
bilistic method; pseudorandom generators.
1. INTRODUCTION
Roughly speaking, an extractor is a function which extracts (almost) truly
random bits from a weak random source, using a small number of additional
random bits as a catalyst. A large body of work has focused on giving explicit con-
structions of extractors, as such constructions have a wide variety of applications. A
recent breakthrough was made by Luca Trevisan [Tre99], who discovered that the
Nisan–Wigderson pseudorandom generator [NW94], previously only used in a
computational setting, could be used to construct extractors. For certain settings of
the parameters, Trevisan’s extractor is optimal and improves on previous construc-
tions. More explicitly, Trevisan’s extractor improves over previous constructions in
the case of extracting a relatively small number of random bits (e.g., extracting k1−a
bits from source with ‘‘k bits of randomness’’, where a > 0 is an arbitrarily small
constant) with a relatively large statistical difference from uniform distribution
(e.g., constant e, where e is the statistical difference from uniform distribution
required from the output). However, when one wants to extract more than a small
fraction of the randomness from the weak random source, or when one wants to
achieve a small statistical difference from uniform distribution, Trevisan’s extractor
performs poorly (in that a large number of truly random ‘‘catalyst’’ bits are
needed).
In this paper, we show that Trevisan’s ideas can be used in a more general and
efficient way. We present two new ideas that improve Trevisan’s construction. The
first idea allows one to extract more than a small fraction of the randomness from
the weakly random source. In particular, the idea can be used to extract all of the
randomness from the weak random source. This is accomplished by replacing the
‘‘combinatorial designs’’ underlying the Nisan–Wigderson generator and Trevisan’s
construction with a weaker (and more suitable) notion. Applying a result of
Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99] to these extractors, we also obtain improved
constructions of highly expanding graphs and superconcentrators.
The second idea improves Trevisan’s construction in the case where the output
bits are required to be of a relatively small statistical difference from uniform dis-
tribution. The two ideas can be combined, and the final outcome is a set of new
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extractors that use fewer truly random bits than any previous construction which
extracts at least a constant fraction of the randomness from any weak random
source.
Extractors
The definition of an extractor requires quantifying two notions: how much ran-
domness is in a probability distribution, and what it means for two distributions to
be close. The first is measured using a variant of entropy. A distribution X on
{0, 1}n is said to have min-entropy k if for all x ¥ {0, 1}n, Pr[X=x] [ 2−k. This
should be thought of as saying that X has (at least) ‘‘k bits of randomness.’’ For
example, if X is uniformly distributed on a set of size 2k, then X has min-entropy k.
The distance measure between probability distributions used is a standard one.
Two distributions X and Y on a set S are said to have statistical difference (or
variation distance) e if
max
D
|Pr[D(X)=1]−Pr[D(Y)=1]|=e,
where the maximum is taken over all functions (‘‘distinguishers’’) D: SQ {0, 1}.
A function Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m is called a (k, e)-extractor if for every
distribution X on {0, 1}n of min-entropy k, the induced distribution Ext(X, Ud) on
{0, 1}m has statistical difference at most e from Um (where Uj denotes the uniform
distribution on {0, 1} j). In other words, Ext extracts m (almost) truly random bits
from a source with k bits of hidden randomness using d additional random bits as a
catalyst. The goal is to construct extractors which minimize d while m is as close to
k as possible. Nonconstructively, it can be shown that for every n, k [ n, and e > 0,
there exists a (k, e)-extractor Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m with m=k and
d=O(log(n/e)); i.e., all the randomness of the source is extracted using only
logarithmically many additional truly random bits.5 However, we are interested
5 Actually, since the extractor is fed d truly random bits in addition to the k bits of hidden random-
ness, one can hope to have m be close to k+d. This will be discussed in more detail under the heading
‘‘Entropy loss and strong extractors.’’
in explicit constructions. More precisely, a family of extractors {Exti: {0, 1}ni×
{0, 1}di Q {0, 1}mi}i ¥ I is called explicit if Exti can be evaluated in time poly(ni, di).
Dispersers are the analogue of extractors for one-sided error; instead of inducing
the uniform distribution, they simply hit all but a e fraction of points in {0, 1}m
with nonzero probability.
Other notations. ‘‘log’’ indicates the logarithm base 2 and ‘‘ln’’ denotes the
natural logarithm. If X is a probability distribution on a finite set, we write xPX
to indicate that x is selected according to X.
Previous Work
Dispersers were first defined by Sipser [Sip88] and extractors were first defined
by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96]. Much of the motivation for research on extrac-
tors comes from work done on ‘‘somewhat random sources’’ [SV86, CG88,
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Vaz87b, VV85, Vaz84, Vaz87a, CW89, Zuc96]. There have been a number of
papers giving explicit constructions of dispersers and extractors, with a steady
improvement in the parameters [Zuc96, NZ96, WZ99, GW97, SZ98, SSZ98, NT98,
Zuc97, Ta-98, Tre99]. Most of the work on extractors was based on techniques
such as k-wise independence, the leftover hash lemma [ILL89], and various forms
of composition. A new approach to constructing extractors was recently initiated by
Trevisan [Tre99], who discovered a fascinating connection between constructing
extractors and constructing pseudorandom generators from hard functions
[Tre99]. In addition to establishing this connection, Trevisan used it to give a
strikingly simple extractor construction based on the Nisan–Wigderson pseudo-
random generator. This is the starting point for our work.
Explicit constructions of extractors and dispersers have a wide variety of appli-
cations, including simulating randomized algorithms with weak random sources
[Zuc96]; constructing oblivious samplers [Zuc97]; constructive leader election
[Zuc97, RZ98]; randomness-efficient error reduction in randomized algorithms
and interactive proofs [Zuc97]; explicit constructions of expander graphs, super-
concentrators, and sorting networks [WZ99]; hardness of approximation [Zuc96,
Uma99]; pseudorandom generators for space-bounded computation [NZ96,
RR99]; derandomizing BPP under circuit complexity assumptions [ACR97,
STV99]; and other problems in complexity theory [Sip88, GZ97].
For a detailed survey of previous work on extractors and their applications, see
[NT98].
Main Results
The first family of extractors constructed in this paper is given in the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. For every n, k, m ¥N and e > 0, such that m [ k [ n, there are
explicit (k, e)-extractors Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m with
1. d=O(log
2(n/e)
log(k/m)), or
2. d=O(log2(n/e) · log(1/c)), where 1+c=k/(m−1), and c < 1/2.
In particular, using the second extractor with k=m, we can extract all of the min-
entropy of the source using
O(log2(n/e) · log k)
additional random bits. (If e is constant then this is just O(log2 n · log k) additional
random bits). Using the first extractor with k/m constant, we can extract any con-
stant fraction of the min-entropy of the source using
O(log2(n/e))
additional random bits. (If e is constant then this is just O(log2 n) additional
random bits).
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TABLE 1
Summary of Our Constructions
Reference min-entropy k Output length m Additional randomness d Type
Theorem 1 any k m=(1−a) k d=O(log2(n/e)) extractor
any k m=k d=O(log2(n/e) · log k) extractor
Theorem 2 any k m=k1−a d=O(log2 n · log(1/e)/log k) extractor
any k m=(1−a) k d=O(log2n · log(1/e)) extractor
any k m=k d=O(log2n · log(1/e) · log k) extractor
Note. a is an arbitrarily small constant.
An undesirable feature of the extractors in Theorem 1 (and the extractor of
Trevisan [Tre99]) is that the number of truly random bits depends quadratically on
log(1/e). In (nonconstructive) optimal extractors and even some previous con-
structions (discussed later), this dependence is linear. Indeed, some applications of
extractors, such as [RR99], require a linear dependence. In our second theorem, we
improve our extractors to have a linear dependence on log(1/e).
Theorem 2. For every n, k, m, and e, such that m [ k [ n, there are explicit
(k, e)-extractors Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m with
1. d=O(log
2n · log(1/e)
log(k/m) ), or
2. d=O(log2n · log(1/c) · log(1/e)), where 1+c=k/(m−1), and c < 1/2.
Thus, in all cases, the log2(n/e) in Theorem 1 has been replaced with
log2 n · log(1/e), which is an improvement when e is relatively small. One case of
note is when we want to extract m=k1−a bits from a source of min-entropy k \ na,
for an arbitrarily small constant a > 0. This is the case in which Trevisan’s extractor
performs best, using d=O(log2(n/e)/log n) truly random bits (which is O(log n)
for e \ 1/poly(n)). In this case, Theorem 2 gives
d=O(log n · log(1/e)),
which is an improvement for small e. We only provide a sketch of Theorem 2,
because the results have been superseded by our recent work [RRV99a] which
gives a general method to reduce the error of any extractor.
TABLE 2
Best Previous Constructions
Reference min-entropy k Output length m Additional randomness d Type
[GWi97] any k m=k d=O(n−k+log(1/e)) extractor
[Zuc97] k=W(n) m=(1−a) k d=O(log(n/e)) extractor
[NT98] any k m=k d=O(log9 n · log(1/e)) extractor
[Ta-98] any k m=k−polylog(n) d=O(log(n/e)) disperser
[Tre99] any k m=k1−a d=O(log2(n/e)/log k) extractor
ultimate goal any k m=k d=O(log(n/e)) extractor
Note. a is an arbitrarily small constant.
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A summary of our results is given in Table 1, and a comparison with the best
previous constructions is given in Table 2. Trevisan’s construction [Tre99] uses
only O(log2(n/e)/log k) truly random bits but extracts only a small fraction (k1−a)
of the source min-entropy. The best previous construction that extracts
all of the source min-entropy was given by Ta-Shma [NT98] and used
O(log9 n · log(1/e)) truly random bits.6 Our extractors use more truly random bits
6 In [NT98], the number of truly random bits used by the extractor is given as d=polylog n, a poly-
nomial of unspecified degree in log n. Ta-Shma [TS98] estimates the degree of this polynomial to be 9.
than the extractor of [Zuc97] and the disperser of [Ta-98], but our extractors have
the advantage that they work for any min-entropy (unlike [Zuc97]) and are extrac-
tors rather than dispersers (unlike [Ta-98]). The disadvantage of the extractors of
[GW97] described in Table 2 is that they only use a small number of truly random
bits when the source min-entropy k is very close to the input length n (e.g.,
k=n−polylog(n)). There are also extractors given in [GW97, SZ98] which extract
all of the min-entropy, but these use a small number of truly random bits only when
the source min-entropy is very small (e.g., k=polylog(n)), and these extractors are
further discussed in the context of entropy loss.
Plugging the second extractor of Theorem 1 into a construction of [WZ99] (see
also [NT98]) immediately yields the following construction of highly expanding
graphs:
Corollary 3. For every N and K [N, there is an explicitly constructible7 graph
7 By explicitly constructible, we mean that, given N and K, the graph can be constructed deterministi-
cally in time poly(N).
on N nodes with degree (N/K) ·2O((loglogN)
2(loglog K)) such that every two disjoint sets of
vertices of size at least K have an edge between them.
This compares with a degree bound of (N/K) ·2O((log logN)
9) due to Ta-Shma
[NT98]. We also obtain similarly improved constructions of depth-2 superconcen-
trators, using general techniques for building them from extractors [WZ99, NT98].
These highly expanding graphs and depth-2 superconcentrators have further appli-
cations to sorting and selecting in rounds, constructing small-depth linear-sized
superconcentrators, and constructing non-blocking networks [Pip87, AKSS89,
WZ99], so our results translate similar improvements in each of these applications.
We remark that the construction of [WZ99] used to obtain Corollary 3 requires
extractors that extract nearly all the entropy of the source.
Entropy Loss and Strong Extractors
Since a (k, e)-extractor Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m is given k bits of hidden
randomness in its first input and d truly random bits in its second input, one can
actually hope for the output length m to be almost k+d, rather than just k. The
quantity D=k+d−m is therefore called the entropy loss of the extractor. Hence, in
this language, the goal in constructing extractors is to simultaneously minimize
both d and the entropy loss.
Actually, in some applications of extractors, it is important not only to retain the
randomness of the d truly random bits invested, but to explicitly retain their values
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in the output. This leads to a more stringent notion of extractors. A function
Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m is called a strong (k, e)-extractor if for every distri-
bution X on {0, 1}n of min-entropy k, the induced distribution (Ud, Ext(X, Ud)) on
{0, 1}d×{0, 1}m has statistical difference at most e from Ud×Um. Naturally, the
entropy loss of a strong extractor is defined to be D=k−m.
Nonconstructively, one can show that, for any n and k [ n, there exist strong
extractors Extn, k: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}k−D with d=log(n−k)+2 log(1/e)+
O(1) and entropy loss D=2 log(1/e)+O(1), and these bounds on d and D are tight
up to additive constants (even for nonstrong extractors) [RT97]. The explicit con-
structions, however, are still far from achieving these parameters. As for previous
results, every entry in Table 2 yields a (not necessarily strong8) extractor with an
8However, subsequent to this work, it was shown how to transform any extractor into a strong
extractor, with only a small cost in the other parameters [RSW00].
entropy loss of k+d−m, by definition. For example, the extractor of [NT98] and
the disperser of [Ta-98] have entropy losses of polylog n. The extractor of [GW97]
is actually better than Table 2 indicates; it is a strong extractor with an entropy loss
of n−k+O(log(1/e)) (though this is only interesting when k is very close to n). In
addition, the ‘‘tiny families of hash functions’’ of [SZ98] give strong extractors
with d=O(k+log n) and entropy loss 2 log(1/e)+O(1); these have optimal
entropy loss but are only interesting when k is very small (e.g., k=polylog n), as d
is linear in k. (The fact that d here does not explicitly depend on e is not a contra-
diction to the lower bound on d, as no nontrivial extraction is occurring when k < D
and the lower bounds do not apply.)
Our extractors are in fact strong extractors. Moreover, by combining the second
extractors of Theorems 1 and 2 with the low min-entropy extractors of [SZ98], we
are able to achieve optimal entropy loss (up to an additive constant):
Theorem 4. For every n, k ¥N, and e > 0 such that k [ n, there are explicit
strong (k, e)-extractors Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}k−D with entropy loss
D=2 log(1/e)+O(1),
and
1. d=O(log2(n/e) · log k), or
2. d=O(log2 n · log(1/e) · log k).
In particular, in order for the output of the extractor to have statistical difference
.01 from uniform, one need only lose a constant number of bits of entropy. A
comparison of this result with previous results on entropy loss is given in Table 3.
Techniques and Tools
Here we briefly highlight some of the techniques and tools used to achieve our
improvements. In particular, we give the definitions of both combinatorial designs
and weak designs.
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TABLE 3
Results on Entropy Loss
Reference Additional randomness d Entropy loss D Type Strong?
[GWi97] d=O(n−k+log(1/e)) D=n−k+12 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor yes
[GWi97] d=n−k+2 log(1/e)+O(1) D=2 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor no
[SZ98] d=O(k+log n) D=2 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor yes
[NT98] d=O(log9 n · log(1/e)) D=O(log9 n · log(1/e)) extractor no
[TS98] d=O(log(n/e)) D=polylog(n/e) disperser no
Theorem 4 d=O(log2(n/e) · log k) D=2 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor yes
d=O(log2 n · log(1/e) · log k) D=2 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor yes
Nonconstructive d=log(n−k)+2 log(1/e)+O(1) D=2 log(1/e)+O(1) extractor yes
& optimal
[RT97]
Note. All of the work is for any source of min-entropy k.
Designs. The main combinatorial objects underlying the Nisan–Wigderson
pseudorandom generator and subsequently Trevisan’s extractors are collections of
sets with small pairwise intersections. Following [NW94], we will refer to these
as designs, but in the combinatorics literature, they are often called packings
(cf. [AS00, Sect. 4.7]).
Definition 5. For a ¥N and r \ 1, a family of sets S1, ..., Sm … [d] is an (a, r)-
design if
1. For all i, |Si |=a.
2. For all i ] j, |Si 5 Sj | [ log r.
The first improvement of this paper stems from the observation that actually a
weaker form of designs suffices for the analysis of [NW94, Tre99]. As it turns out,
it is sufficient to use a set system in which the quantity maxi ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| is small (in
contrast to designs, in which maxi ] j |Si 5 Sj | is bounded). We call such set systems
weak designs.
Definition 6. A family of sets S1, ..., Sm … [d] is a weak (a, r)-design if
1. For all i, |Si |=a.
2. For all i,
C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| [ r · (m−1).
Clearly, every (a, r)-design is also an (a, r)-weak design, but not conversely.
Indeed, we will see that, for some settings of parameters, it is possible to have the
universe size d much smaller for weak designs than the corresponding designs. This
will allow our extractors to attain a much smaller seed length than Trevisan’s
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extractors when extracting most or all of the min-entropy from the source. The
weak designs used in the first extractor of Theorem 1 are constructed using an
application of the probabilistic method, which we then derandomize using the
method of conditional expectations (cf. AS00 and [MR95, Chap. 5]). We then
apply a simple iteration to these first weak designs to obtain the weak designs used
in the second extractor. We also prove a lower bound showing that our weak
designs are near-optimal.
Multilinear error-correcting codes. The second improvement of the paper
(reducing the dependence of the seed length on e) is achieved by using a specific
error-correcting code rather than an arbitrary one. More specifically, we use mul-
tilinear error-correcting codes over finite fields. The main property we use is that
the restriction of a multilinear function to a subset of its input variables is still a
multilinear function. We can hence bound the description size of that restriction by
the description size of a multilinear function rather than the description size of an
arbitrary function. This turns out to be very useful in the extractor analysis.
A general method to obtain optimal entropy loss. For our third improvement, we
observe that a method of Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99] (with a slightly
refined analysis) along with the ‘‘low min-entropy’’ extractor of Srinivasan and
Zuckerman [SZ98] can be used to reduce the entropy loss of any extractor to the
optimal value of 2 log 1/e+O(1). This transformation increases the seed length of
an extractor by at most O(log n+D) bits, where D is the initial entropy loss. Apply-
ing this general transformation to the extractors of Theorems 1 and 2 gives the
extractors of Theorem 4.
Organization
In Section 2, we analyze the Trevisan extractor and show that weak designs can
be used instead of standard designs in this construction. Section 3 contains our
results on the construction of weak designs. We also give lower bounds showing
that the parameters achieved by our weak designs are impossible for standard
designs, and that our constructions of them are nearly optimal. Theorem 1 is
proven in Section 4 (as a corollary of the results of Sections 2 and 3). In Section 5,
we sketch our method for improving the dependence on the error as claimed in
Theorem 2. In Section 6, we give a general method for obtaining optimal entropy
loss in extractors. In Section 7, we show that using a relaxed notion of designs also
gives some quantitative improvements over [NW94] in the construction of pseu-
dorandom generators from hard Boolean functions. We conclude with a discussion
of subsequent work and open problems in Section 8.
2. THE EXTRACTOR
In this section, we describe the Trevisan extractor and present a more refined
analysis of it. Most importantly, we show that weak designs can be used instead of
standard designs. We also show that it is in fact a strong extractor (i.e., the seed can
be given as part of the output). Aside from these two improvements, the description
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of the extractor follows [Tre99] very closely. The main tool in the Trevisan
extractor is the Nisan–Wigderson pseudorandom generator [NW94]. Let
S=(S1, ..., Sm) be a collection of subsets of [d] of size a, and let
P: {0, 1}aQ {0, 1} be any Boolean function. For a string y ¥ {0, 1}d, define y|Si to
be the string in {0, 1}a obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by
Si. Then the Nisan–Wigderson generator NWS, P is defined as
NWS, P(y)=P(y|S1 ) · · ·P(y|Sm ).
In addition to the Nisan–Wigderson generator, the Trevisan extractor makes use
of error-correcting codes. We need codes satisfying the following lemma. Such
codes can be obtained using standard techniques; for completeness a proof is given
in Appendix 1.
Lemma 7 (Error-correcting codes). For every n ¥N and d > 0 there is a code
ECn, d: {0, 1}nQ {0, 1} n¯ where n¯=poly(n, 1/d) such that every Hamming ball of
relative radius 1/2−d in {0, 1} n¯ contains at most 1/d2 codewords. Furthermore,
ECn, d can be evaluated in time poly(n, 1/d) and n¯ can be assumed to be a power of 2.
We can now describe the Trevisan extractor, which takes as parameters
n, m, k ¥N, and e > 0, where m [ k [ n. Let EC: {0, 1}nQ {0, 1} n¯ be as in
Lemma 7, with d=e/4m and define a=logn¯=O(log n/e). For u ¥ {0, 1}n, we view
EC(u) as a Boolean function u¯: {0, 1}aQ {0, 1}. Let S=(S1, ..., Sm) be a collection
of subsets of [d] (for some d) such that |Si |=a for each i. (How S is selected will
crucially affect the performance of the extractor; we will later choose it to be one of
our weak designs.)
Then the extractor ExtS: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m is defined as
ExtS(u, y)=NWS, u¯(y)=u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|Sm ).
We will now analyze this extractor. The following lemma, due to Yao, allows us
to focus on ‘‘next-bit predictors’’ instead of distinguishers.
Lemma 8 [Yao82]. Suppose that OY, ZP is a distribution on {0, 1}d×{0, 1}m s.t.
Y is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}d yet the statistical difference of OY, ZP from
Ud×Um is greater than e. Then there is an i ¥ [m] and a function (‘‘next-bit predica-
tor’’) A: {0, 1}d×{0, 1} i−1Q {0, 1} such that
Pr
Oy, zPP OY, ZP
[A(y, z1z2 · · · zi−1)=zi] >
1
2
+
e
m
.
Moreover, if there is a circuit D: {0, 1}d×{0, 1}mQ {0, 1} of size s distinguishing
OY, ZP from Ud×Um with advantage e, then A may also be taken to be of circuit
complexity s.
We will not use the ‘‘moreover’’ part of Lemma 8 in the analysis of our extractor;
it will only be used for our quantitative improvement to the pseudorandom genera-
tors of [NW94] given in Section 7.
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The following lemma is a refinement of ones in [NW94, Tre99]. It shows how,
from any next-bit predictor A for NWS, P, one can obtain a ‘‘program’’ of small
description size (or circuit complexity) which, using A as an oracle, computes P
with noticeable advantage.
Lemma 9. Fix S. For every i ¥ [m], there is a set Fi of functions from {0, 1}a to
{0, 1}d+i−1 (depending only onS and i) such that
1. For every function P: {0, 1}aQ {0, 1} and every predictor A: {0, 1}d+i−1Q
{0, 1}, there exists a function f ¥Fi such that
Pr
x
[A(f(x))=P(x)] \ Pr
y
[A(y, P(y|S1 ) · · ·P(y|Si−1 ))=P(y|Si )],
where x is selected uniformly from {0, 1}a and y from {0, 1}d.
2. log |Fi | [ d+; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj|.
3. Each function in Fi can be computed by a circuit of size O(; j < i
(2 |Si 5 Sj|−1)).9
9 We measure circuit size by the number of internal gates, so, for example, the identity function has
circuit size 0.
The main improvement over [NW94, Tre99] in Lemma 9 is the use of
; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| rather than (i−1) · 2maxj |Si 5 Sj| in the bound on |Fi |. This refined bound
illustrates the connection with weak designs. We will not use Item 3 (the bound on
circuit size) in the analysis of our extractor; we only use this for the construction of
pseudorandom generators in Section 7.
Proof. Let
a=Pr
y
[A(y, P(y|S1 ) · · ·P(y|Si−1 ))=P(y|Si )]
By an averaging argument we can fix all the bits of y outside Si while preserving the
prediction probability. Renaming y|Si as x, we now observe that x varies uniformly
over {0, 1}a while P(y|Sj ) for j ] i is now a function Pj of x that depends on only
|Si 5 Sj | bits of x. So, we have
Pr
x
[A(y(x), P1(x) · · ·Pi−1(x))=P(x)] \ a.
Therefore, it suffices to let Fi be the set of functions f of the form
xW (y(x), P1(x), P2(x), ..., Pi−1(x)), where Pj(x) depends only some set Tij of bits
of x, where |Tij |=|Si 5 Sj |. The number of bits it takes to represent each Pj is
2 |Tij|=2 |Si 5 Sj|. Also, y(x) is simply a function that places x in the positions indexed
by Si and is fixed in the other d− a positions. So, the total number of bits it takes to
represent a function in Fi is at most d− a+; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj|, giving the desired bound
on log |Fi |. For the bound on circuit size, notice that the circuit size of f is simply
the sum of the circuit sizes of the Pj’s, and every function on t bits can be computed
by a circuit of size c · (2 t−1), for some constant c (cf. [Weg87, Theorem 2.2]). Note
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that this bound on circuit size is even true for t=0, since we count the circuit size
of a constant function as 0. L
We now analyze the extractor ExtS when we take S to be a weak design. The
argument follows the analysis of Trevisan’s extractor in [Tre99] except that we use
the more refined bounds on |Fi | given by Lemma 9.
Proposition 10. If S=(S1, ..., Sm) (with Si … [d]) is a weak (a, r)-design for
r=(k−3 log(m/e)−d−3)/m, then ExtS: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m is a strong
(k, e)-extractor.
Proof. Let X be any distribution of min-entropy k. We need to show that the
statistical difference between OUd Ext(X, Ud)P and Ud×Um is at most e. By
Lemma 8, it suffices to show that for every next-bit predictor A:{0, 1}d×
{0, 1} i−1Q {0, 1},
Pr
uPX, y
[A(y, u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|Si−1 ))=u¯(y|Si )] [
1
2
+
e
m
,
where y is selected uniformly from {0, 1}d. So let A:{0, 1}d×{0, 1} i−1Q {0, 1} be
any next-bit predictor and letFi be as in Lemma 9, so that |Fi | < 2d+rm.
Let B be the set of u for which there exists an f ¥Fi such that
Prx[A(f(x))=u¯(x)] > 1/2+e/2m. In other words, B is the set of ‘‘bad’’ u for
which u¯ can be approximated by a function of small ‘‘description size’’ relative to A.
Now a counting argument will show that this can only happen with small probabil-
ity, since u¯ is a codeword in an error-correcting code selected according to a distri-
bution with high min-entropy. By the property of the error-correcting code given in
Lemma 7, for each function f ¥Fi, there are at most (2m/e)2 strings u ¥ {0, 1}n
such that Prx[A(f(x))=u¯(x)] > 1/2+e/2m. By the union bound,
|B| [ (2m/e)2 · |Fi | < (2m/e)2 · 2d+rm.
Since X has min-entropy k, each u ¥ B has probability at most 2−k of being selected
from X, so
Pr
uPX
[u ¥ B] < ((2m/e)2 2d+rm) · 2−k
=((2m/e)2 2d+k−3 log(m/e)−d−3) · 2−k
=e/2m
Now, by Lemma 9, if u ¨ B, then
Pr
y
[A(y, u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|Si−1 ))=u¯(y|Si )] [
1
2
+
e
2m
.
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Thus,
Pr
uPX, y
[A(y, u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|Si−1 ))=u¯(y|Si )] [ Pr
uPX
[u ¥ B]+ Pr
uPX
[u ¨ B] ·11
2
+
e
2m
2
[
e
2m
+11
2
+
e
2m
2
=
1
2
+
e
m
. L
The bound r=(k−3 log(m/e)−d−3)/m can be viewed as follows: we start with
min-entropy k, then we immediately incur a (typically small) entropy loss of
3 log(m/e)−d−3, and then the output m is a 1/r fraction of what is left.
Remark 11. Two improvements to the above analysis can slightly reduce the
entropy loss of 3 log(m/e)+d+O(1) incurred in Proposition 10. We only give brief
sketches of these improvements, since the savings will be completely subsumed by
our general entropy loss reduction technique in Section 6. First, d bits of entropy
loss can be completely eliminated by doing things a little differently. Specifically,
the bits of y outside Si can be fixed at the same time as when Lemma 8 is applied
and absorbed into the predictor A. The key point is that these bits need not depend
on the particular sample u selected from the source X and hence they need not
count towards the ‘‘description size’’ of u.
Second, the 3 log(m/e) bits of entropy loss can be improved to
2 log(1/e)+3 log m+O(1). This is achieved by partitioning the set of ‘‘bad’’ u for
which u¯ can be approximated by a function of the form A(f( · )), into sets Bj
according to the quality of approximation (e.g., take Bj to be those u for which u¯
can be approximated with error between 1/2−2 je/2m and 1/2−2 j−1e/2m). Then
we use an error-correcting code in which for every dŒ \ d (rather than just dŒ=d)
any Hamming ball of relative radius 1/2−dŒ contains at most 1/(dŒ)2 codewords.
Doing the analysis separately for each Bj has the effect of balancing the probability
that uPX lands in Bj against the maximum advantage possible for u in Bj.
Remark 12. An interesting feature of our extractors is that for mŒ [ m, the
mŒ-bit prefix of the output is essentially the same as if the extractor had been con-
structed for output length mŒ. This makes it possible to construct (k, e)-extractors
Ext with the property that even if Ext is applied to a source of (unknown) min-
entropy kŒ < k, an mŒ=mŒ(kŒ) prefix of the output will still be e-close to uniform.
To implement this idea, one should use our construction of weak designs in
Lemma 15, which has the property that the weak (a, r)-design (S1, ..., Sm) con-
structed is such that for every i, (S1, ..., Si) is also a weak (a, r)-design.
3. DESIGNS—CONSTRUCTIONS AND LOWER BOUNDS
To motivate our design constructions, observe that in extractor analysis above,
the parameters of a design correspond to the parameters of the extractor as follows
(in the discussion below the parameter e of the extractor is fixed, for simplicity, to
be some small constant):
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source min−entropy % rm
output length=m
input length=2G(a)
additional randomness=d
Hence, our goal in constructing designs is to minimize d given parameters m, a, and
r (such that r \ 1). Notice that 1/r is essentially the fraction of the source min-
entropy that is extracted, so ideally r would be as close to 1 as possible.
The construction of designs used in Trevisan’s extractor is given by the following
lemma (rediscovered in [NW94, Tre99]):
Lemma 13 [EFF85]. For m, a, d ¥N and r > 1, there exists an efficiently con-
structible (a, r)-design S1, ..., Sm ı [d] if m [ ( dNlog 2rM)/( aNlog 2rM)2. In particular, for any
m, a ¥N and r > 1, one exists with
d=O 1a2 ·m1/log r
log r
2 .
Notice that the dependence of d on r is very poor. In particular, if we want to
extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy, we need more than mW(1) truly
random bits. This is unavoidable with the current definition of designs: if r < 2,
then all the sets must be disjoint, so d \ ma. In general, we have the following lower
bound, which is well known in the ‘‘packing’’ literature (cf. [Röd85]).
Proposition 14. If S1, ..., Sm … [d] is an (a, r)-design, then m [ ( dNlog 2rM)/( aNlog 2rM).
In particular,
d \ m1/log 2r · (a− log r)
Proof. Let I=Nlog 2rM >maxi ] j |Si 5 Sj |. For each j=1, ..., m, let Cj be the set
of subsets of Sj of size I, so |Cj |=(
a
I). Let C=1j Cj. Notice that the sets Cj are
disjoint, because no two distinct sets Si, Sj share I or more elements. Thus,
|C|=m·(aI). At the same time, |C| consists of subsets of [d] of size I, so |C| [ (dI).
So we have
m·1 a
I
2 [ 1d
I
2 ,
establishing the first bound of the proposition. The ‘‘in particular’’ part is obtained
as follows.
m [
1 d
I+1
2
1 a
I+1
2=1
d
a
21d−1
a−1
2 · · ·1d−Ia−I 2 [ 1 da−I2I+1. L
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We will now show that, for many settings of m, a, and r, there exist weak (a, r)-
designs S1, ..., Sm … [d] with much smaller values of d than possible with (a, r)-
designs. In particular, in the following lemma, we give a construction of weak
designs where the universe size d does not depend on m, the number of sets.
Lemma 15. For every a, m ¥N and r > 1, there exists a weak (a, r)-design
S1, ..., Sm … [d] with
d=! a
ln r
" · a.
Moreover, such a family can be found in time poly(m, d).
Proof. Let a, m, and r be given, and let d=Ka/ln rL · a. We view [d] as the
disjoint union of a blocks B1, ..., Ba, each of size Ka/ln rL. We construct the sets
S1, ..., Sm in sequence so that
1. Each set contains exactly one element from each block, and
2. ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| [ r · (i−1).
Existence. Suppose we have S1, ..., Si−1 … [d] satisfying the above conditions.
We prove that there exists a set Si satisfying the required conditions using the Pro-
babilistic Method [AS00] (see also [MR95, Ch. 5]). Let a1, ..., aa be uniformly and
independently selected elements of B1, ..., Ba, respectively, and then let
Si={a1, ..., aa}. We will argue that with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds.
Let Yj, k be the indicator random variable for the event ak ¥ Sj, so
Pr[Yj, k=1]=1/|Bk |=1/Ka/ln rL. Notice that for a fixed j, the random variables
Yj, 1, ..., Yj, a are independent.
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj|6=C
j < i
E [2 C kYj, k]
=C
j < i
E [D
k
2Yj, k]
=C
j < i
D
k
E [2Yj, k]
=(i−1) ·11+ 1
Ka/ln rL
2a
[ (i−1) ·r
Hence, with nonzero probability, Condition 2 holds, so a set Si satisfying the
requirements exists. However, we want to find such a set deterministically. This can
be accomplished by a straightforward application of the method of conditional
expectations (see [AS00] and [MR95, Chap. 5]), as we proceed to show.
Derandomization. Above, we showed that E [; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj|] [ r · (i−1). By
averaging, this implies that there exists an a1 ¥ B1 such that
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| : a1=a16 [ r · (i−1) (1)
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So, assuming we can efficiently calculate the conditional expectation
E [; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| |a1=a1] for every a1 ¥ B1, we can find the a1 that makes Inequal-
ity 1 hold. Then, fixing such an a1, another averaging argument implies that there
exists an a2 ¥ B2 such that
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| : a1=a1, a2=a26 [ r · (i−1) (2)
Again, assuming that we can compute the appropriate conditional expectations, we
can find an a2 that makes Inequality 2 hold. Proceeding like this, we obtain
a1, ..., aa such that
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| : a1=a1, a2=a2, ..., aa=aa 6 [ r · (i−1) (3)
But now there is no more randomness left in the experiment, and Inequality 3
simply says that ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| [ r · (i−1), for Si={a1, ..., aa}. To implement this
algorithm for finding Si, we need to be able to calculate the conditional expectation
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| : a1=a1, ..., at=at6 ,
for any t and a1, ..., at. If we let T={a1, ..., ai}, then a calculation like the one in
the proof of Lemma 15 for the unconditional expectation shows
E 5C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj| : a1=a1, ..., at=at6=C
j < i
2 |T 5 Sj| ·11+ 1
Ka/ln rL
2a−t,
which can be easily computed. L
Remark 16. A perhaps more natural way to carry out the above probabilistic
construction is to choose Si uniformly from the set of all subsets of [d] of size a,
rather than dividing [d] into a blocks. This gives essentially the same bounds, but
complicates the analysis because the elements of Si are no longer independent.
Lemma 15 already gives something much better than Lemma 13; for constant
r > 1, d is O(a2) instead of a2 ·mW(1). However, as r gets very close to 1, d gets very
large. Specifically, if r=1+c for small c, then the above gives d=O(a2/c). To
improve this, we notice that the proof of Lemma 15 does not take advantage of the
fact that there are fewer terms in ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| when i is small; indeed the proof
actually shows how to obtain ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| < r · (i−1).10 Since we only need a bound
10 In fact it is necessary that d=W(a2/log r) if ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| < r · (i−1) for all i. See Remark 19.
of r · (m−1) for all i, this suggests that we should ‘‘pack’’ more sets in the begin-
ning. This packing is accomplished by iterating the construction of Lemma 15
(directly inspired by the iteration of Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99] on
extractors) and yields the following improvement.
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Lemma 17. For every a, m ¥N and 0 < c < 1/2, there exists a weak (a, 1+c)-
design S1, ..., Sm … [d] with
d=O 1a2 · log 1
c
2 .
In particular, for every a, m ¥N, there exists a weak (a, 1)-design S1, ..., Sm … [d]
with
d=O(a2 · log m).
Moreover, these families can be found in time poly(m, d).
Proof. Let d0=Ka/ln 2L · a, h=Klog(4/c)L, and d=h·d0=O(a2 · log(1/c)). We
view [d] as the disjoint union of h blocks B0, ..., Bh−1 each of size d0. For each
t ¥ {0, ..., h−1}, let nt=N(1−2−t) · (1+c/2) ·mM and mt=nt+1−nt. Note that
nh \ m.
Now we define our weak design S1, ..., Sm. For each t ¥ {0, ..., h−1}, we let
Snt+1, ..., Snt+mt … Bt be a weak (a, 2)-design as given by Lemma 15. In other words,
we take the ordered union of h weak (a, 2)-designs (consisting of m1, m2, ..., mh sets,
respectively) using disjoint subsets of the universe for each. The number of sets is
nh \ m, the size of the universe is d, and each set is of size a, so we only need to
check that for all i ¥ [m], ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| < r · (m−1). For i ¥ {nt+1, ..., nt+mt}, Si is
disjoint from any Sj for any j [ nt and
C
i−1
j=nt+1
2 |Si 5 Sj| [ 2 · (mt−1)
since Snt+1, ..., Snt+mt is a weak (a, 2)-design. Thus, we have
C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj|=C
nt
j=1
2 |Si 5 Sj|+ C
i−1
j=nt+1
2 |Si 5 Sj|
[ nt+2·(mt−1)
=2·nt+1−nt−2
< 2 · (1−2−t−1) · (1+c/2) ·m−(1−2−t) · (1+c/2) ·m−1
[ (1+c) · (m−1),
as desired (except when m=1, which is a trivial case). The ‘‘in particular’’ part of
Lemma 17 follows because every weak (a, 1+1/m)-design is actually a weak (a, 1)-
design (since N(1+1/m) · (m−1)M=m−1). L
In terms of our extractors, Lemma 17 translates to extracting essentially all of the
entropy of a source on {0, 1}n of min-entropy k using d=O(log2 n · log k) truly
random bits (as we will prove formally in Section 4). For extractors which use only
O(log n) truly random bits, one would need d=O(a). However, one cannot hope to
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do better than W(a2) using the current analysis with weak designs. Indeed, the
following proposition shows that our weak designs are optimal up to the log(1/c)
factor in our second construction.
Proposition 18. For every weak (a, r)-design S1, ..., Sm … [d],
d \ W 1min 3 a2
log 2r
, ma42
Notice that d=ma can be trivially achieved having all the sets disjoint. More-
over, log 2r approaches 1 as r approaches 1, so the lower bound for m \ a and
r % 1 is W(a2).
Proof. Let m¯=K2d/aL. If m¯ \ m, then d \ a · (m−1)/2=W(ma) and we are
done, so we may assume that m¯ < m. We will now consider only the first m¯ sets. We
have
r \max
i
1
m¯−1
C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj|
\
1
m¯(m¯−1)
C
m¯
i=1
C
j < i
2 |Si 5 Sj|
=
1
2 R 11 m¯
2
2 Cj < i [ m¯ 2 |Si 5 Sj|S
\
1
2
· 2(1/(
m¯
2) C j < i [ m¯ |Si 5 Sj|)
where the last inequality is an application of Jensen’s inequality. Thus,
log 2r >
2
m¯2
C
j < i [ m¯
|Si 5 Sj |. (4)
By the inclusion–exclusion bound,
C
j < i [ m¯
|Si 5 Sj | \ 1 Cm¯
i=1
|Si |2− : 0m¯
i=1
Si :
\ m¯a−d
=2d−d=d.
Putting this in Inequality 4, we have L
log 2r >
2d
m¯2
=
2d
(2d/a)2=
a2
2d
,
which proves the proposition. L
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Remark 19. The above proof gives a stronger bound on d if we have a family of
sets S1, ..., Sm such that for all i, ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| < r · (i−1) (e.g., the family of sets
constructed in the proof of Lemma 15). If we have such a bound, then summing
over i from 1 to m¯ gives
r ·1 m¯
2
2=C
i [ m¯
r · (i−1) > C
j < i [ m¯
2 |Si 5 Sj|,
and applying Jensen’s inequality and taking logs as in the above proof gives
log r >
2
m¯2
C
j < i [ m¯
|Si 5 Sj |
instead of Inequality 4. Following the rest of the proof without change, this shows
that
d \ W 1min 3 a2
log r
, ma42 .
Remark 20. Using an information-theoretic analogue of the inclusion–exclusion
bound, due to Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW96], one can generalize the lower
bound of Proposition 18 to a wider class of generators with similar properties to the
Nisan–Wigderson generator. Specifically, one can prove the following:
Proposition 21. Suppose X=(X1, ..., Xm) and Y=(Y1, ..., Ym) are (jointly
distributed) random variables such that
1. For all i, H(Xi |Yi) \ a, and
2. For all i,
C
j < i
2H(Xj | Yi) [ r · (m−1).
Then
H(X) \ W 1min 3 a2
log 2r
, ma42 .
In Proposition 21, H( · ) denotes the entropy function and H( · | · ) denotes condi-
tional entropy (cf. [CT91]). Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97] had previously
given a statement like Proposition 21 with the second condition replaced by
maxi, j H(Xj |Yi) [ log r; ours is a generalization to the analogue of ‘‘weak designs.’’
The proof directly follows the proof of Proposition 18, replacing the usual inclu-
sion–exclusion bound with that of [IW96], which states that H(X) \
; iH(Xi | Yi)−; j < i H(Xj | Yi).
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To compare Proposition 21 with the Nisan–Wigderson generator NWS, P, let
Xi=x|Si and Yi=x|Si , where x is chosen uniformly at random. In the analysis of
our extractor, the properties of the Nisan–Wigderson generator we use are that,
conditioned on Yi=y, Xi takes on all possible values in {0, 1}a whereas
; j < i nj [ r · (m−1), where nj is the number of values that Xj can take on given
that Yi=y. The properties required by the hypothesis of Proposition 21 are even
weaker.
4. PUTTING IT TOGETHER
Theorem 1 almost follows immediately by combining Proposition 10 with the
weak designs given by Lemmas 15 and 17. The only technicality is that Proposi-
tion 10 does not allow us to take r=k/m (or k/(m−1)) which is what we would
need to deduce Theorem 1 directly. Instead, we use r=(k−D)/m for some
D=O(d) and consequently lose D bits of the source entropy in Proposition 10.
However, since D will be relatively small, we can compensate for this by giving our
extractor D more truly random bits in its seed (increasing the seed length by only a
constant factor) which we just concatenate to the output to compensate for the loss.
We give the details of this below, starting by presenting our extractors as strong
extractors with an extra entropy loss of D=O(d).
Theorem 22. For every n, k, m ¥N and e > 0, such that m [ k [ n, there are
explicit strong (k, e)-extractors Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m−D with
1. d=O(log
2(n/e)
log(k/m)), or
2. d=O(log2(n/e) · log(1/c)), where 1+c=k/(m−1), and c < 1/2,
and D=O(d).
Proof. Let D \ 1 be an integer parameter to be set later, and let kŒ=k−D+1,
mŒ=m−D, r=k/(m−1) [ kŒ/mŒ, and let a=G(log n/e) (as in our extractor con-
struction). For Part 1 (resp., Part 2), let S=(S1, ..., SmŒ), with Si … [dŒ] be the
weak (a, r)-design of Lemma 15 (resp., Lemma 17), so dŒ=O(log2(n/e)/log(k/m))
(resp., dŒ=O(log2(n/e) log(1/c))). Since dŒ is independent of D, we can set
D=d+3 log(m/e)+4=O(d). Proposition 10 tells us that ExtS: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ
{0, 1}mŒ is a strong (k, e)-extractor. L
To obtain Theorem 1, we simply add D extra bits to the seed and concatenate
them to the output. (Recall that Theorem 1 does not claim strong extractors.)
5. REDUCING THE ERROR
The construction given above works well and improves over previous construc-
tions when e is relatively large. However, the number d of truly random bits needed
is quadratic in log(1/e), which is not as good as the linear dependency achieved by
some previous constructions. In this section, we improve this quadratic dependency
in our constructions (and in Trevisan’s construction) to a linear dependency. We
only sketch the proof in this section, as even better extractors can be obtained using
our recent work [RRV99a].
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The quadratic dependence on log(1/e) in our extractor arises from the fact that
an (a, r)-weak design requires a universe whose size grows quadratically with a (cf.
Proposition 18). In the extractor of the previous section (and Trevisan’s extractor),
a is taken to be the logarithm of the length of the error-correcting code used (as we
view codewords as functions P: {0, 1}aQ {0, 1}). The analysis of the extractor
reveals that in order to achieve a small statistical difference e from uniform, we
must use an error-correcting code with very good distance properties; namely, one
in which no Hamming ball of radius 1/2−O(e/m) contains many codewords.
However, an error-correcting code with such a strong distance property must have
length at least poly(n, e), resulting in a=W(log(n/e)), and a seed length that is
quadratic in log(1/e).
The solution we give in this section is to use an error-correcting code over a large
alphabet F, in which we view every codeword as a function from Fa to F rather
than a function from {0, 1}a to {0, 1}. Then it is possible to have a code with very
good distance properties (relative to e) with a being independent of e; only the
alphabet size F need depend on e. Using this approach, we encounter two
problems. The first problem is that the function which computes the codeword P
given a predictor A (as in Lemma 9) will be built from functions of the form
Pj: F |Si 5 Sj|Q F. In the proof of Lemma 9, we bounded the description size of the
Pj’s by the description size of an arbitrary function F |Si 5 Sj|Q F, which is 2 |Si 5 Sj|
when F={0, 1}. But, as F increases in size, this bound on description size becomes
too large to handle. The second problem is that, when we use a large alphabet, the
output of the extractor consists of elements of F rather than bits. We will not be
able to argue that these elements of F are uniformly distributed, but rather that
(with high enough probability) the ith element of F in the output is unpredictable
given the first i−1 elements of F.
The solution to the first problem comes from our choice of error-correcting
codes. We use multilinear error correcting codes (over finite fields) rather than the
arbitrary error correcting codes used in Section 2. We can then make use of the fact
that the restriction of a multilinear function to a subset of its input variables is still
a multilinear function. We can hence bound the description size of that restriction
by the description size of a multilinear function rather than the description size of
an arbitrary function.
The second problem can be solved using standard techniques. Specifically, the
fact that the ith component of the output is (almost always) unpredictable given the
first i−1 components means that the output is what is known as an (almost) block-
wise source [CG88]. In our case, the block-wise source has blocks of logarithmic
length, and standard techniques can be used to extract truly random bits from such
a source using a small number of additional truly random bits.
Let F be some fixed finite field such that log |F| % c · log(n/e), where c is some
sufficiently large constant (say c=10). For e \ 1/n, the dependence on e in the
extractors of Theorem 1 can be absorbed into the hidden constant. Thus, we will
only need to use the constructions of this section in case e < 1/n, and hence we may
assume that
log |F|=O(log(1/e)).
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In this section, we think of an extractor Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}m as a func-
tion
Ext: FnŒ×FdŒQ FmŒ,
where nŒ=n/(log |F|), dŒ=d/(log |F|) and mŒ=m/(log |F|). (We assume for sim-
plicity that nŒ, dŒ, mŒ, log nŒ, and log |F| are all integers.)
LetS=(S1, ..., SmŒ) be a collection of subsets of [dŒ] such that |Si |=a for each i,
and let P: FaQ F be any function. For a string y ¥ FdŒ, define y|Si to be the string in
Fa obtained by projecting y onto the coordinates specified by Si. Then we define
NW −S, P as
NW −S, P (y)=P(y|S1 ) · · ·P(y|SmŒ ).
We will use in this section a=log nŒ; note that a is bounded by log n, independent
of e. Let G be the set of all functions from Fa to F. A multilinear function from Fa
to F is a function of a variables over F that is linear (over F) in each one of the
variables. There are |F|2
a
=|F|nŒ multilinear functions from Fa to F (one needs to
specify 2a coefficients), so we may define an error-correcting code EC: FnŒQ G
which associates to each element u of FnŒ a distinct multilinear function
EC(u)=u¯: FaQ F. The distance property of this code is formalized by the follow-
ing standard bound:
Lemma 23 (cf. [GRS00, Theorem 17]). For every function Q: FaQ F, there are
at most O(`|F|/a ) codewords (i.e., multilinear functions) that agree with Q in at
least a `2a/|F| fraction of the points in Fa.
We define the function BW−ExtS: FnŒ×FdŒQ FmŒ as
BW−ExtS(u, y)=NW
−
S, u¯ (y)=u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|SmŒ ).
(The function BW−Ext is not our final extractor. Rather, it will be used to extract
an (almost) block-wise source; hence the notation BW−Ext.) Note that the number
of truly random bits used by BW−Ext is dŒlog |F|=O(dŒ · log(1/e)). The following
lemma is analogous to Lemma 9. It shows how, from any next-element predictor A
for NW −S, P , one can obtain a program of small description size (or circuit com-
plexity) which, using A as an oracle, computes P with noticeable advantage.
Lemma 24. Fix S. For every i ¥ [mŒ], there is a set Fi of functions from Fa to
FdŒ+i−1 (depending only on F,S and i) such that
1. For every multilinear function P: FaQ F and every predictor A: FdŒ+i−1
Q F, there exists a function f ¥Fi such that
Pr
x
[A(f(x))=P(x)] \ Pr
y
[A(y, P(y|S1 ) · · ·P(y|Si−1 ))=P(y|Si )],
where x is selected uniformly from Fa and y from FdŒ.
2. log |Fi | [ (dŒ+; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj|) · log |F|.
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For the proof, we use the fact that the restriction of a multilinear function to a
subset of its input variables is a multilinear function, and the fact that the logarithm
of the number of multilinear functions in |Si 5 Sj | variables is 2 |Si 5 Sj| · log |F|.
Otherwise, the proof is similar to the one of Lemma 9.
Now assume that S is a weak (a, r)-design for r=(k−d−c · log |F|)/m (where,
say, c=10), and let X be any distribution of min-entropy k. The following propo-
sition shows that BW−Ext(X, Ud) does not have a good next-element predictor.
The proposition is analogous to Proposition 10.
Proposition 25. If S=(S1, ..., SmŒ) (with Si … [dŒ]) is a weak (a, r)-design for
r=(k−d−c · log |F|)/m (where c is some sufficiently large constant, say c=10),
and X is a distribution of min-entropy k then for every next-element predictor
A: FdŒ+i−1Q F,
Pr
uPX, y
[A(y, u¯(y|S1 ) · · · u¯(y|Si−1 ))=u¯(y|Si )] [
1
|F|d
,
where d is some (not too small) constant (say d=1/4) and where y is selected uni-
formly from FdŒ.
The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 10, except that we use the distance
property of multilinear error-correcting codes given by Lemma 23 and we use
Lemma 24 rather than Lemma 9.
In general, the function BW−ExtS is not a good extractor. Nevertheless, by
Proposition 25, we know that (with probability m·(1/|F|W(1))) each element
BW−Ext(X, Ud) has large min-entropy (W(log |F|) bits) given all its predecessors.
That is, it is close to a block-wise source in the sense of [CG88], in which the min-
entropy of each block given the predecessors (and the seed) is a constant fraction of
its length (which is log |F|). We can now construct an extractor from BW−ExtS in
one of the following ways:
1. By applying on the entire output BW−Ext(X, Ud) the extractor of
[Zuc97] that extracts a constant fraction of the min-entropy as long as the min-
entropy is at least a constant fraction of the number of bits.
2. By applying on each element of BW−Ext(X, Ud) a pairwise independent
hash function h: {0, 1} log |F|Q {0, 1}dŒ · log |F|, where dŒ is some small constant (we can
apply the same hash function on all the elements). This is a special case of the block-
wise extraction methods of [CG88, NZ96].
Both ways are very efficient in terms of the number of additional random bits
needed.
The first part of Theorem 2 is now obtained by using the weak designs given by
Lemma 15 (as in the proof of Theorem 1). The resulting seed length (using an (a, r)-
weak design for r=(k−d−c · log |F|)/m) is
d=O(dŒlog(1/e))=O 1 a2
log r
· log(1/e)2 .
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However, the number of bits we extract is only dŒ · log |F| ·mŒ=dŒm % dŒk/r, for
some constant dŒ < 1. Hence, we can only directly use this to extract up to a small
constant fraction of the min-entropy (even if we use the weak designs of
Lemma 17). In order to extract more of the min-entropy of the source, we will need
to use iterations, as in [WZ99] (cf. Lemma 26). A constant number of iterations
will allow us to extract any constant fraction of the min-entropy. In general, to
obtain m=k/(1+c), we will need O(log(1/c)) iterations and hence we need
O(log2n · log(1/e) · log(1/c)) additional random bits.
6. ACHIEVING OPTIMAL ENTROPY LOSS
In this section we give a general method for reducing the entropy loss of extrac-
tors (recall that the entropy loss of an extractor is the quantity D=k+d−m).
Applied to the extractors of previous sections, this transformation gives the extrac-
tors of Theorem 4 which have optimal entropy loss (up to a constant additive term)
of 2 log 1/e+O(1).
We use an idea due to Wigderson and Zuckerman [WZ99]: Suppose we have a
strong (k, e)-extractor Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}k−D with entropy loss D. Now,
if X is a source of min-entropy k, then conditioned on ‘‘most’’ values of
(Ud, Ext(X, Ud)), X will still have min-entropy close to D. So, we can use a differ-
ent extractor (with fresh truly random bits) to extract some more of this min-
entropy. This is formalized by the following lemma, which slightly strengthens one
in [WZ99]:
Lemma 26. Let s > 0. Suppose Ext1: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d1 Q {0, 1}m1 is a strong
(k, e1)-extractor with entropy loss D1 and Ext2: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d2 Q {0, 1}m2 is a
strong (D1−s, e2)-extractor with entropy loss D2. Define Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d1+d2 Q
{0, 1}m1+m2 by
Ext(x, (y1, y2))=Ext1(x, y1) p Ext2(x, y2),
where p denotes concatenation. Then Ext is a strong (k, ( 1
1−2 −s
) · e1+e2) with entropy
loss D2+s.
The main difference from the corresponding lemma in [WZ99] is that the statis-
tical difference from uniform in Ext has a better dependence on s (in [WZ99], the
expression is e1+e2+2−s). There is also an analogue of Lemma 26 for nonstrong
extractors; in that case, Ext2 should be applied to the pair (x, y1) rather than
just x. Details can be found in the preliminary version of this work [RRV99b].
Before proving Lemma 26, let us see how it can be used to obtain extractors with
near optimal entropy loss. Note that the entropy loss of Ext in Lemma 26 only
depends on the entropy loss of Ext2. Furthermore, Ext2 needs to work for min-
entropy D1 (the entropy loss of Ext1) which will be relatively small (i.e., O(d1)) in
our application. We therefore need extractors which work well for small min-
entropy (and in particular have very small entropy loss). Such extractors are the
‘‘low min-entropy’’ extractors of Srinivasan and Zuckerman [SZ98]:
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Lemma 27 [SZ98]. For every n, k [ n, and e > 0, there is an explicit strong (k, e)-
extractor Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}k−D with entropy loss D=2Klog(1/e)L+2 and
d=O(k+log n).
The transformation we were looking for (that reduces the entropy loss of extrac-
tors) is now obtained as a simple corollary of Lemmas 26 and 27:
Lemma 28. Let Ext1: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d1 Q {0, 1}k−D1 be any strong (k, e/4)-
extractor with entropy loss D1. Then there exists a strong (k, e)-extractor
Ext: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d1+d2 W {0, 1}k−D such that
1. Ext has entropy loss D=2Klog(1/e)L+5,
2. d2=O(D1+log n), and
3. Ext is computable in polynomial time with one oracle query to Ext1.
Proof. By Lemma 27, there is an explicit strong (D1−1, e/2)-extractor
Ext2:{0, 1}n×{0, 1}d2 Q {0, 1}D1 −1−D2 with d2=O(D1+log n) and entropy loss
D2=2Klog(2/e)L+2=2Klog(1/e)L+4. Combining Ext1 and Ext2 via Lemma 26
(with s=1) gives a (k, e)-extractor Ext :{0, 1}n×{0, 1}dQ {0, 1}k−D such that
1. Ext has entropy loss D=D2+1=2Klog(1/e)L+5
2. d=d1+d2.
3. Since Ext2 is explicit, Ext is computable in polynomial time with one
oracle query to Ext1. L
The transformation of Lemma 28 applies to any extractor Ext1.11However, it is
11 Although the lemma is stated only for strong extractors, an analogous lemma holds for nonstrong
extractors (using the analogue of Lemma 26 for nonstrong extractors mentioned above).
especially interesting when the entropy loss of Ext1 is O(d1). In this case, the seed
length of Ext is only larger by a constant factor than the seed length of Ext1 (i.e.,
the transformation is not ‘‘too costly’’). One example of such extractors is the con-
struction of [NT98] (where the seed length and entropy loss are both O(log9 n)).
Other examples are our constructions in the previous sections. Applying Lemma 28
to these extractors gives the extractors of Theorem 4 as a simple corollary:
Proof of Theorem 4. Part 1 of the theorem is obtained by applying Lemma 28 to
the second extractor of Theorem 22 (with m=k) as Ext1. Part 2 of the theorem is
obtained by applying Lemma 28 to the second extractor of (the strong extractor
version of) Theorem 2. L
Proof of Lemma 26. Let X be any source of min-entropy k. Let L be the set of
pairs (y, z) ¥ {0, 1}d1×{0, 1}m1 such that Pr[Ext1(X, y)=z] < 2−(m1+s) (i.e., L is
the set of pairs (y, z) for which z is ‘‘light’’ under Ext1( · , y), in the sense that it
occurs with probability that is smaller than uniform by a factor of 2 s). Recall that
the entropy loss is defined as D1=k−m1.
Claim 29. For every (y, z) ¨ L, the conditional distribution of X given that
Ext1(X, y)=z has min-entropy at least D1−s.
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Proof of claim. For every x such that Ext1(x, y)=z,
Pr[X=x |Ext1(X, y)=z]=
Pr[X=x]
Pr[Ext1(X, y)=z]
[
2−k
2−m1 −s
=2−(D1 −s).
This proves Claim 29. L
Thus, since Ext2 is a (D1−s, e2)-extractor, for every (y, z) ¨ L, the conditional
distribution of (Ud2 , Ext2(X, Ud2 )) given that (Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 ))=(y, z) has sta-
tistical difference at most e2 from uniform. Now we argue that (Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 ))
lands in L with low probability.
Claim 30. Pr[(Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) ¥ L] [ e1/(2
s−1).
Proofof claim. Forevery (y, z) ¥ L,Pr[Ud1 ×Um1=(y, z)] > 2
s ·Pr[(Ud1 , Ext1(X,
Ud1 ))=(y, z)]. Thus, Pr[Ud1 ×Um1 ¥ L] \ 2
s ·Pr[(Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) ¥ L]. Now, by
definition, the statistical difference between Ud1 ×Um1 and (Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) is at
least
Pr[Ud1 ×Um1 ¥ L]
−Pr[(Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) ¥ L] \ (2
s−1) ·Pr[(Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) ¥ L].
Since Ext1 is a strong (k, e1)-extractor, this statistical difference is at most e1, and
the claim follows. L
Thus, (Ud1 , Ext1(X, Ud1 )) p (Ud2 , Ext2(X, Ud2 )) can be described as a joint dis-
tribution A p B with following properties:
1. A has statistical difference at most e1 from Ud1 ×Um1 .
2. With probability at least 1−d over aP A, B|A=a has statistical difference
at most e2 from Ud2 ×Um2 (where d=e1/(2
s−1)).
From this, it follows that A p B has statistical difference at most
e1+d+e2=(
1
1−2 −s
) · e1+e2 from Ud1 ×Um1 ×Ud2 ×Um2=Ud1+d2 ×Um1+m2 , proving
Lemma 26. L
7. BETTER PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS
Using alternative types of designs also gives some quantitative improvements in
the construction of pseudorandom generators from hard predicates in [NW94].
From Lemma 9, we see that the relevant notion of design in the setting of pseu-
dorandom generation versus small circuits is the following:
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Definition 31. A family of sets S1, ..., Sm … [d] is a type 2 weak (a, r)-design if
1. For all i, |Si |=a.
2. For all i,
C
j < i
(2 |Si 5 Sj|−1) [ r · (m−1).
Notice that it is meaningful to consider even values of r less than 1, since
2 |Si 5 Sj|−1 can be zero. Using the same construction as Lemma 15, we obtain:
Lemma 32. For every a, m ¥N and r > 0, there exists a type 2 weak (a, r)-design
S1, ..., Sm … [d] with
d=! a
ln(1+r)
" · a.
Moreover, such a family can be found in time poly(m, d).
Proof. The construction of a weak (a, rŒ)-design in Lemma 15 actually gives a
family of sets S1, ..., Sm such that for all i, ; j < i 2 |Si 5 Sj| [ rŒ · (i−1), which implies
that ; j < i (2 |Si 5 Sj|−1) [ (rŒ−1) · (i−1) [ (rŒ−1) · (m−1). Setting rŒ=r+1, we
have a type 2 weak (a, r) design, and the universe size is d=Ka/ln rŒL · a=
Ka/ln(1+r)L · a. L
The quantitative relation between pseudorandom generators and (type 2) weak
designs follows readily from Lemmas 8 and 9:
Lemma 33. Suppose P:{0, 1}aQ {0, 1} is a predicate such that no circuit of size s
can compute P correctly on more than a fraction 12+e of the inputs and suppose that
S=(S1, ..., Sm) where Si … [d] is a type 2 weak (a, r)-design. Then no circuit of size
s−O(r ·m) can distinguish NWS, P from uniform with advantage greater than me.
Combining this and Lemma 32 with s=2m and r a small constant, we obtain
Theorem 34. Suppose P:{0, 1}aQ {0, 1} is a predicate such that no circuit of size
2m can compute P correctly on more than a fraction 12+
e
m of the inputs. Then there is
a generator GP, m: {0, 1}O(a
2)
Q {0, 1}m computable in time poly(m, a), making m
oracle calls to P, such that no circuit of size m can distinguish the output of G from
uniform with advantage greater than e.
In other words, to obtain m bits which are pseudorandom against circuits of size
m, we need only assume that there is a predicate which is hard against circuits of
size O(m). In contrast, the results of [NW94] always need to assume that the pre-
dicate is hard against circuits of size m1+E for some constant E > 0 (or else their
generator will require a seed length that is polynomial in m instead of a). In fact, if
we instead take r=1/a, we need only assume that the predicate is hard against
circuits of size (1+1/a) ·m (and the generator will have a seed length O(a3)).
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8. SUBSEQUENT WORK AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Subsequent to the original version of this work [RRV99b], there have been
several papers giving further improved extractor constructions, which bring us
closer to (but not yet at) the ultimate goal of optimal extractors for all settings of
parameters [RRV99a, ISW00, RVW00, RSW00, TSUZ01].
The work most directly related to ours is that of Hartman and Raz [HR00],
which is not concerned with improving the parameters but rather the explicitness.
Specifically, they show how to construct extractors with the same parameters as
ours, but which are computable in logarithmic space rather than just polynomial
time. They do this by giving a logarithmic-space construction of weak designs based
on low-degree polynomials. (Our construction of weak designs, based on the
method of conditional expectations, appears inherently sequential.)
We remark that it might be possible to obtain extractors which extract all the
randomness using a seed of length O(log2 n) just by giving an improved construc-
tion of weak designs. This corresponds to the gap of G(log 1/c) between our upper
and lower bounds for weak designs (Lemma 17 and Proposition 18). We leave
closing this gap as an open problem.
A. ERROR-CORRECTING CODES
Proof of Lemma 7. The code we need can be obtained by ‘‘concatenating’’ a
Reed–Solomon code with a Hadamard code (cf. [MS77]). Specifically, given
parameters n and d, let s=d2 and let m=Klog(n/s)L. Let Had: {0, 1}mQ {0, 1}2
m
be the Hadamard code—that is, for x, y ¥ {0, 1}m, the yth component of Had(x) is
the inner-product of x and y mod 2. Thus, for x1 ] x2, Had(x1) and Had(x2) have
(relative) Hamming distance 1/2. Let F=GF(2m); an explicit description of F can
be found in time poly(2m)=poly(n, 1/d) by exhaustively searching for an irreduc-
ible polynomial of degree m over GF(2). We can view strings x ¥ {0, 1}n …
({0, 1}m) Kn/mL as giving the coefficients of a polynomial px of degree at most d=
Kn/mL over F.
Now we define the error-correcting code EC: {0, 1}nQ ({0, 1}2
m
) |F| as
EC(x)=(Had(px(a1)), ..., Had(px(a|F|))),
where a1, ..., a|F| are all the elements of F. Thus the codewords are of length
n¯=2m · |F|=O(n2/d4). Now we show that the (relative) minimum distance of this
code is 1/2−s/2. For any two distinct elements x and y of {0, 1}n, px and py
disagree in at least |F|−d elements F (as they are distinct polynomials of degree d).
For each a such that px(a) ] py(a), Had(px(a)) and Had(py(a)) disagree in 2m/2
positions. Thus, for distinct x and y, EC(x) and EC(y) disagree in at least
q=(|F|−d) · 2m/2 positions, for a relative distance of
q
|F| · 2m
=
1
2
−
d
2|F|
\
1
2
−
n
2(n/s)
=
1
2
−
s
2
.
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Now we apply the following general bound (cf. [BellareGoSu98, Lemma A.1]).
Lemma 35. Suppose C is an error-correcting code with (relative) minimum
distance \ 1/2−b/2. Then every Hamming ball of (relative) radius 1/2−`b
contains at most 1/3b codewords.
Applying this lemma with C=EC and b=s, we see that every Hamming ball of
relative radius 1/2−d has at most 1/3d2 < 1/d2 codewords. L
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